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Populism: a deflationary
view
Maxine Molyneux and Thomas Osborne
Abstract
This paper takes a critical, synoptic view of the current upsurge of populism.
Populism, it is argued, has long been a feature of liberal democracies in so far
as claims are made for democracy to be as directly expressive as possible of the
will of its subjects. Yet populisms are hybrid in form and parasitic on existing pol-
itical arrangements. What unites them is more to do with what they oppose than
what they espouse. Above all, it is the norms of liberalism that are brought into
question by populist proponents of direct democracy with their characteristic hos-
tility towards elites, experts and the so-called establishment. In so far as all popu-
lisms can be dangerous this lies in the degree to which they oppose the existing
norms of liberalism and seek to undermine its moderating institutions. Rather
than relying on generic theories of populism to explain contemporary develop-
ments, what needs investigation is the degree to which particular populisms prior-
itize fear over judgement, unqualified assertion over reasoned deliberation and
resentment over the moderation of power.
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Too much has been made of populism as if its varieties have, in Jan-Werner
Müller’s terms, an ineluctable ‘inner logic’; as if it were a transcultural and
wholly coherent form of political organization, even a kind of political ‘regime’ or
a technology of government akin to ‘bureaucracy’ or ‘totalitarianism’; or some
kind of radical alternative to liberal democracy (cf. Lefort, 1986; Müller, 2016,
p. 10). But populism is not really a ‘thing’ at all. It is, rather, an ‘effect’, a style, a
syndrome, a device – or series of devices – involving, to varying degrees and inten-
sities, the myth of direct popular power – a component of politics of different
shades. Populism is generically hybrid and parasitic; in myriad forms, sometimes
in extremis, sometimes not, it has long coexisted with liberalism and democracy.
Instead of bemoaning the current populist wave across the globe, we should
begin by disaggregating it into its different forms and components, exploring the
many ways in which populisms graft onto other kinds of political action, other
kinds of political form.
This approach, we suggest, allows us to be more critically discriminating than
we might have been had we regarded populism as a single kind of political form
or attitude. Populism can certainly be dangerous to liberal democracies. Yet too
often this ascription of dangerousness is either applied to populism tout court, or
is scarcely more discriminatingly applied within a left/right dichotomy, where
leftist populism would be ‘progressive’, rightist reactionary. Rather, we argue
that the key to understanding populism relies crucially on existing institutional
forms and traditions that are in place – what Machiavelli called the given
‘subject-matter’ – the subietto – of political conduct (Machiavelli, 1976 [1532],
p. 27). Where populism grafts onto institutional forms that are already of an
anti-liberal, a weakly liberal or authoritarian kind, then populism will take
much of its colour from that situation. When populism is grafted onto traditions
that are connected to and support liberal traditions and institutions – whether of
left or right – it can be a dynamic, creative and positively disruptive force. Of
further obvious import is whether what is at stake is an oppositional populism
or a populism of office, a populism that has taken power. But in whatever case
we are considering, our deflationary approach does not imply a sanguine atti-
tude to political events; it implies, rather, empiricism and realism. We are defla-
tionary about the concept, but the varying manifestation of populism in actual
political forms should lead us, in some cases anyway, to be far from deflationary.
When populism is combined with intolerance, nativism, bigotry – as it so often,
though not always, is – then obviously populism can be classified from a liberal
perspective as being dangerous. But often these aspects are not just down to
populism but down to more prosaic factors: racism, opportunism or fear, for
example. Most obviously we need a clear sense of the contextual variation of
diverse populisms. Such an approach will complicate things rather than simplify
them, but that is not necessarily a bad thing if it can help us adjust our expec-
tations towards a principled kind of realism rather than either a naïve utopian-
ism or an abject hopelessness.
2 Economy and Society
Varieties of populism
Populism is promiscuous in that it appears across the entire political spectrum and
can apply to figures as different from each other as Vladimir Putin, Beppo Grillo,
Jeremy Corbyn or Boris Johnson. Those who want to say that populism is one
thing typically find themselves reducing it to one variety, or one element, often
one of a rightist kind. But then the term itself becomes, arguably, redundant –
since one might as well simply invoke rightist politics rather than populism per
se. On the other hand, generalizing views tend not to capture all populisms.
For instance, populism is not to be identified necessarily with a resistance to plur-
alism, as does Jan-Werner Müller (2016) in his analysis. This, again, is to assume
that populism is an inherently rightist phenomenon. In the United KingdomCor-
bynism surely has a very strong populist component, and yet in many ways its
pluralist credentials are more pronounced than those of its opponents.
However, we do agree with Müller that, in fact, in many of its manifestations
populism is more moral than political (Müller, 2016, pp. 19–20). But it is not
just about a moralizing attitude towards ‘the people’, though populism is that –
it is about a moralizing attitude towards the realities of power. This is the
notion that the people (however determined in each case) have a moral sover-
eignty that it is the duty of representative politics to express as directly as possible.
Politics, so far as populists are concerned, has to translate the people’s will in as
pristine and unmediated a form as possible. Indeed, what populists have in
common is really a moral idea – that political opinion can be expressed, so far
as possible, without the mediation of institutions.
Populisms, in this sense, are united more in what they reject than in what they
espouse; and what they reject, or at least what they are generically suspicious of,
is any idea of mediated power. In effect they espouse what Wilhelm Hennis
called the ‘principle of identity’: the idea that governed and governors could
and should form a kind of expressive unity (Hennis, 2009, pp. 41; cf.
Schmitt, 1985 [1923], pp. 26–27). Identitarianism is not about a politics of iden-
tity; rather it is the myth, in fact, of direct power. Different populisms can be
assessed, in this sense, by the extent to which they demand power without
mediation – in other words by the extent to which they want to collapse the pol-
itical into the moral. Obviously, not all populisms reject representative insti-
tutions to the same extent, and it is important to note that none reject
representation completely. This is not least what separates populism from
fascism. Fascist leaders want to militarize the social body and usually to
expunge existing forms of representation altogether. Populisms, in contrast,
tend to be parasitic upon liberalism and representative institutions. In giving
power ‘back’ to the people, populisms seek to capture existing arrangements
to do so. In so far as Corbynism is populist, it seeks to restore representative
institutions to its popular base, not to expunge them altogether. Populism
then, as various writers have pointed out, is more like a ‘syndrome’ that
varies in intensity rather than a single thing (Laclau, 2005, p. 14; Shils, 1996
[1956]; Worsley in Ionescu & Gellner, 1969, p. 244). And this is why one can
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see elements of populism in many political movements that are not simply popu-
list as such: for instance, in the politics of Tony Blair or Margaret Thatcher.
In this sense, populism is – as Müller has argued – a ‘shadow’ on democracy,
but not necessarily a dark one that blights its host (Müller, 2016, p. 11). Like-
wise, contra Rosanvallon (2008), who describes populism as a ‘pathology’ of
democracy, it is expressive or at least symptomatic of the democratic ideal
itself – that the people should rule, that the people have sovereignty. Here is
the dilemma with which Rousseau damned liberalism, and which Benjamin
Constant turned into the paradox that was constitutive of it. Liberal democra-
cies always have to balance the demands of expression – what we could call the
identitarian principle – with the realities of political mediation, representation
and governance through institutions. Nevertheless, the prioritization of the
people is, in itself, a moral one. The idea of popular rule is not given, it has
to be made political; and that is where populisms have tended to clash with
more liberal conceptions of governance, as if populist demands have to be trans-
lated into politics. This also explains why populists tend to be hostile to the
existing rules of the game. Populists of all stripes tend to despise what they
regard as the establishment, politics as usual. This is a principled opposition
in the sense that ‘establishments’ by definition are political phenomena that,
so far as populists are concerned, contradict the identitarian principle, leading
at best to compromise, and at worse to betrayal of the moral integrity of the
people’s will. Populists would rather stay on the moral ground – not necessarily
the ‘high’moral ground of course. This is why so much populism can seem anti-
political, making demands that go beyond what generally seem to be the limits of
political attainability. In this sense, it is not only establishments that populisms
are wary of but also, more generically, just politics in the sense of the rules of the
game. Populisms typically embody a moral conception of politics.
Our argument is that in studying populisms we need to take special notice of
the means by which demands of a politically moralistic nature get translated into
the political environment. What are the relays between the moral valorization of
some or other kind of ‘people’ and politicization, political action, political
power? First of all, of course, peoples themselves have to be made; they have
to have some kind of conception of themselves. There are many forms of
such recognition; the only important point to make is that the people is not a
given but is always a construction. We hardly need to go into the voluminous
and much-cited literature on this topic (Weber, 1976; Anderson, 2016; and so
on). Nor do we need to show that this construction will often rely on some per-
ceived sense of wrong that generates resentment towards those who supposedly
connive in prolonging it – outsiders, migrants, minorities, elites, the establish-
ment. This is why nativism is such a common factor in right-wing populisms.
Nativists know who the people are because they are the ones who are already
there. Mexicans, Muslims – these are not native. But while nativism is a
common aspect of populism, it is not essential to it. The people always has an
‘outside’. Even if this is not posed in terms of ethnicity, race or other kinds
of exclusion, it can take the form of conspiratorial thinking, an enemy within,
4 Economy and Society
those who betray us, the elites, the establishment and so on. Populism can of
course often embrace both types.
Populism’s suspicion of institutions, and the identitarian principle that is
common to all variants, renders it particularly susceptible to fantasies of per-
sonal leadership. It is leaders not institutions that express the popular will.
But leaders do not only lead the people; in many ways they constitute them.
Hence the volatility of the fortunes of populisms. When their leaders die,
resign or disappear, populisms often quite suddenly falter. Leaders are typically
key to the politicization of populisms. They establish themselves as relays
between the moral purity of some or other popular will and the actual political
realization of populist hopes. Populist leaders are invariably ‘doers’ not mere
thinkers – hence the anti-intellectual character of so many populisms. This is
Donald Trump saying he is going to build a wall, an act of semiosis which
turns the moral rejection of outsiders – in this case Mexican migrants – into
an index of political decisiveness. The point is not so much that a wall will or
will not be built; the point is to signal that the leader gets things done, that
the leader can do it.
But not all leaderships are the same. Corbynite hagiology is a long way, of
course, from Trumpist gung-ho bullishness. And of course leadership styles
follow existing traditions. Latin American populism has been described as orig-
inating in the caudillo tradition of the strong leader that brooks no nonsense
(Ionescu & Gellner, 1969, p. 33). Yet Peronism’s golden couple Evita and
Juan Domingo highlight another trope of populisms, the rhetoric of affect.
Eva Perón’s particular variant was to speak of her ‘love’ for the people, describ-
ing herself as the heart of Peronism, her husband as the ‘head’ in emotive
declarations that moved mass demonstrations to tears. This sort of populist
trope would be impossible in the world of Donald Trump, one imagines. But
these differences are not just matters of individual style, they are down to
Machiavellian ‘subject-matter’. Where there are political traditions of authori-
tarianism, then populism will unsurprisingly be coloured by those traditions.
On the other hand, in state formations with more liberal traditions, populism
will more likely tend to promote those who are seen as ordinary, sometimes
with bizarre effects.
At stake here are differing rationalities of trust, and different ways of signal-
ling to voters that the leader is ‘one of them’ (Manin, 1997, p. 130). Even Mar-
garet Thatcher was not an oddity in this respect: she famously claimed to run
the nation’s finances as a housewife would, with the home in Thatcher’s
analogy constituting its moral heart. Jeremy Corbyn is presented as ordinary,
well-meaning, quite simple and good, and even – arguably – Boris Johnson’s
buffoonery makes him, in effect, an example of what we could call the idiocy
of power in democratic societies. Theodor Adorno wrote famously of Adolf
Hitler that he combined the qualities of King Kong with those of a suburban
barber – the absurd little man condensed into a super-hero (Adorno, 1991,
p. 122). Of course, idiocy works in different ways: Jeremy Corbyn is appreciated
by his supporters as a simple man, a man of principle, and so not like an ordinary
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politician of the establishment. Corbyn’s style has a kind of anti-charismatic
quality that gives him, paradoxically, an odd kind of charisma for his following.
Whether he is actually ordinary or not is another matter. Nevertheless, idiocy
effects are, we suggest, quite real. Populist trust can be generated by idiocy
in that such a personal style is both an individualizing yet also a hard-to-fake
device for signalling trust on the lines of ‘if I am this absurd (or, if Trump,
this out of line), I must be genuine’. The ancient Greek notion of idiocy distin-
guished it from the rationality of the citizen; in this sense, the idiot is not a fool
but a genuine, ordinary person – perhaps one who sees through the tired con-
ventions of politics. Churchill’s popularity no doubt relied on similar effects;
and a certain shared idiocy is perhaps the only area in which we should be pre-
pared to countenance Johnson’s own self-acclaimed parallels with Churchill. In
any case, we may be in need of a comparative historiography of leadership styles
that would throw light on the varieties of populism in the context of differing
political traditions.
All this suggests that in spite of common factors – the identitarian principle,
the role of leaders rather than institutions, the people against the establishment
– the atlas of populism is one of more or less endless variety. Populism has no
prototypes. There is no quintessential form of it from which we can deduce the
rest. It cannot be derived, for instance, from any historical essence. Yet the long-
evity of the populist idea in history suggests that it is ineluctably tied, to various
degrees, to democratic reality itself. Populism is as ancient as democracy. Thu-
cydides’s description of the demagogue Cleon, for instance, has plenty of reson-
ances in subsequent history (2013, p. 183 ff.; cf. Osborne, 2017). Cleon loathed
the Athenian nobility – they were the elite, the establishment. Against the
wishes of the ruling nobility – the establishment in effect – he persuaded the
Athenians in 427 BC to order the slaughter of the inhabitants of Mytilene
who had defected from their protection. The Athenians in the Assembly then
had second thoughts and decided not to carry out the slaughter. But Cleon,
in full demagogic spate, persuaded them to stick to the original, ruthless plan
– and over a thousand Mytilene citizens were executed. The account in Thucy-
dides is useful because it is not simply dismissive of populism; Thucydides
seems to dislike Cleon intensely, but he does not seem that surprised by him,
nor particularly alarmed by the fact that he is a demagogue. Rather, for Thucy-
dides, his sort just seems to be symptomatic of democracy itself.
If the ancient Greek example registers the beginnings of a chronology for
populism, it nonetheless offers no prototype of it. Nor are there prototypes of
it in the modern era. Modern populism – the word as well as the entity –
emerged in Russia and the United States in the nineteenth century, and in
both cases it was, broadly speaking, an agrarian movement. This led some
writers to see something essentially agrarian in populism (think Frank
L. Baum’s Wonderful Wizard of Oz). In Russia, the populist moment was led
by an urban narodnik intelligentsia, whereas in the United States the Populist
Party retained its rural roots. Both of the original modern populisms were
recognizable as something of the left, the Russian version anti-capitalist, the
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US version hostile above all to the urban intelligentsia, railroad and banking
interests (Kazin, 1998). Yet it goes without saying that subsequent history
has hardly demonstrated that populism is exclusively a phenomenon of the
left. Each was populist in so far as what was valorized was a hard-working, vir-
tuous people pitted against what was regarded as a treacherous, self-interested
elite. But Czarism and the Republican hierarchy were hardly kindred foe any
more than the average Russian peasant was equivalent to a Colorado
smallholder.
The lack of a common political core to – or a basic prototype of – populism is
further highlighted by probably the most extended series of cases in the modern
era: twentieth-century Latin America (Conniff, 1999). Unlike earlier forms of
populism (the Peruvian APRA founded in 1924 being a partial exception),
Latin American versions, appearing later, tended to be urban in character.
Such figures as Vargas and Perón drew their support from urban workers,
some of whom came from recent rural stock, and from sections of the military,
though they themselves could count as middle class. Populism characterized all
sorts of Latin American oppositional movements, but it became a signal feature
of government for some 20 years from the 1940s, the so-called ‘classic’ period of
Latin American corporatist-populism. In Argentina, Perón created a form of
nationalist-authoritarian syndicalism, variants of which could be found at differ-
ent times under very different conditions in Brazil and Chile, and Peru in 1968
(among others). Even when led by military men, these populisms were more
often than not allied to some democratic institutions, such as elections and par-
liaments in those countries where these already had some implantation. While
these governments were often supported by the left, they have frustrated
attempts to characterize them in terms of conventional left–right divisions. In
some cases, as with Peronism, they have combined elements from across the
political spectrum. Peronism’s long history both in opposition and in power
saw it pragmatically aligned at different times with leftist and rightist policies,
governing with varying degrees of authoritarian and democratic principles, pur-
suing with equal vigour neoliberal and heterodox economic policies. Whatever
their complexion, Latin American populisms sought to sustain popular support
through redistributive policies, with, in the case of Peronism, remarkably
durable effect.
While never far from the region’s politics since the heyday of classic popu-
lism, populism in office reappears again in the so-called Pink Tide of the new
millennium that brought leftist or left-of-centre governments to power. While
these later ‘neo-populists’ shared elements of their rhetoric with their post-
war predecessors, promising action and radical change to favour the poor,
drawing on and reinvigorating nationalist sentiments and pursuing more hetero-
dox and redistributive economic policies, these commonalities were less telling
than their differences of governance, forms of state, popular base and policy.
Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa, respectively of Venezuela,
Bolivia and Ecuador, may all have claimed to be twenty-first-century socialists,
but theories seeking to amalgamate them into a single expression of populism,
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whether on the basis of structural determinants or rhetoric, remain at best
superficial.
If Latin American populisms in power, in so far as we can generalize about
them at all, seem to be exemplary of a particular kind of statist populism,
they should not necessarily be seen as a paradigm case. Populisms are all
hybrid. Conditioning factors for such hybridity include most obviously the
context in which the populism in question is enacted; for instance, whether
what is at issue is a populism, left or right, of opposition and resistance – ‘out-
sider’ populism – or the populism of office. Perón in the 1940s, Putin and to an
extent Erdoğan today represent a populism of office whereby their official status
is deployed to generate and manipulate popular support, whereas they were not
exactly populist leaders before taking office, certainly not in Putin’s case. Of
course, outsider populism can turn into the populism of office – in the
Russian context, the career of Boris Yeltsin, for example – but then taking
office is never without risks in terms of distorting or transforming one’s very
sources of support. The debate over the direction of the Trump presidency
is indicative of this. There are those who see Trump as a threat to US democ-
racy itself, whilst others are more sanguine, arguing that the entrenched insti-
tutions of US liberal democracy will function as a bulwark to raw populism
in power (Singh, 2017).
Populism and liberal democracy
Now, whether or not this kind of deflationary view of Trump overestimates the
resilience of US liberal democracy is of course an empirical matter (cf. Runci-
man, 2016). On the other hand, if Trump’s regime descends – as seems per-
fectly possible – into outright authoritarianism this will not be simply down
to its populism but down to the illiberal intolerance of Trump and the fragility
of institutions – representative and legal – to counteract that intolerance. No
‘theory’ of populism would help us in this respect. But that is because, in any
case, populism is too variegated to be susceptible to theory of any but the ‘thin-
nest’ kind. Theories tend to commit their proponents to one-sided normative
views of populism – either that it is pathological, or in the case of some that
it is a useful corrective to the narrow rules of the game of liberal democracy
(Laclau, 1997, 2005). In either case, populism and liberal democracy are held
to be terms that are essentially external to each other. Leverage for the idea
that populism and liberal democracy cannot coexist – that populism is a negative
shadow or pathology of liberal democracy – takes force from a problematic tra-
dition in political theory that dissociates liberalism and democracy altogether.
In contrast, we argue that we need to think not in terms of any absolute con-
tradiction between populism and liberal democracy but in terms of how –
empirically – democracy, liberalism and populism operate together and at
times against each other. If anything, what we are seeing today in the global
spread of populisms of all kinds is not so much the growth of some kind of
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homogeneous if amorphous wave of populism but a loss of confidence in the
principles and institutions of liberal democracy, played out at different intensi-
ties and in different ways. It is as if the populist side of democracy has taken
sides against its liberal side. But democracy, of course, has always been torn
in this respect. Political philosophers and theorists are used to the idea that lib-
eralism and democracy represent an uneasy partnership (Bobbio, 1987). There
is no particular reason for the demos to be liberal; on the contrary, the demos
can be brutal, reactionary and exclusionary (Mann, 2005; Schmitt, 1985
[1923], p. 9). And it is true that liberalism in much political theory has been
as much about restricting the passions of the demos as about promoting
them. Enlightenment political theory – Montesquieu, Hume – regarded the
masses as intemperate and emotional; government was to provide moderation
from these tendencies. Indeed moderation here meant not some kind of
middle ground but something more like a system of counter-balances against
‘enthusiasm’, whether of peoples or princes. The principle of representation
has been crucial to liberalism in this context. Representation moderates
power, limits passions. For Benjamin Constant representation was the centre-
piece of a liberal order. Here he was echoing Hume and his insistence that
‘effects of democracy without a representative’ were ‘tumult and sedition’ fol-
lowed inevitably by despotism (Hume, 1994 [1777], p. 16).
But it is a mistake to assume a radical disjunction between liberal institutions
and populist passion. As Constant also stressed, modern liberty needs the pas-
sions to energize itself in the first place (Constant, 1988a [1819], p. 327; Holmes,
1984). Constant’s point was not that ancient participatory models of liberty were
completely dead, rather that they were transformed and in any case were not
sufficient in the context of the growth of modern privatism and individualism.
It is possible to imagine democracy without liberalism, but not liberalism
without democracy. Central to both is the ethos of equal treatment and equality
of citizenship if not necessarily of power and status. Moreover, liberalism is the
most equitable form of meeting basic demands of legitimation in the predomi-
nantly secular circumstances of political modernity (Williams, 2007, p. 7). As
Shklar (1998) argued, liberalism and democracy, if not exactly joined at the
hip, are certainly in some kind of marriage of convenience. Nevertheless,
given what we termed Rousseau’s problem, democracy is arguably as much in
need of liberalism as the latter is in need of the former. There is no clear way
in which the will of the people can be realized, assuming – as Rousseau did –
that direct democracy was impossible except in very small states. Public
choice theory goes further to claim – broadly on the basis of Condorcet’s
paradox – that there is, in any case, no such thing as the demos: democracies
require elections, and elections sort voting choices non-transitively; in other
words, majorities on particular questions do not exist (Riker, 1982). In this
sense, there is no such thing as ‘we, the people’. Some political theorists,
such as Nadia Urbinati, have claimed, quite plausibly, that in fact liberal insti-
tutions are a better approximation to the will of the demos than is populism or
any form of direct democracy, that – via dissemination of all sorts of practices
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and norms of political judgement – indirect democracy expresses popular sover-
eignty better than does the populist ideal of direct, identitarian democracy
(Urbinati, 2006).
Of course, most populists do in fact accept the representative principle in
some form or other (Müller, 2016, p. 25). Yet the logic of populism means
that most would adhere, more or less, to the doctrine of representation as del-
egation, by which representatives are there to express exactly what their con-
stituents want them to express. In contrast we have, most famously, the
Edmund Burke of the Address to the Electors of Bristol, stating that represen-
tation is in fact a trust, that representatives are elected to serve the salus populi
and not any particular constituency. The trust model leaves it to the conscience
of representatives as to how they vote. As David Hume saw over two centuries
ago, however, all democratic representative systems have to be, in effect, a com-
bination of both these principles, and the long-standing debate between them
underestimates the extent to which this is always a matter of give-and-take
and compromise. Representation in liberal democracies is always a matter of a
certain moderation between delegation and trust, between, as it were, the prin-
ciples of democracy and liberalism. To begin with, an election is an opportunity
to assess the merits, or not, of a representative on matters of delegation. But
more generally, it is implausible that the representatives of modern political
systems might be unaware of bodies of opinion in their constituencies and,
no doubt precisely with the prospect of elections in mind, seek to accommodate
them so far as that is possible.
Of course this is something of a dialectical process whereby parties pitch ideas
to constituencies in the hope of resonating with their concerns. Political argu-
ment requires parties to focus debate, to reduce complexity on the wide array
of issues that can confront us in political life; in doing so they necessarily
need to appeal to particular emotional as well as rational constituencies,
indeed to particular constituencies – workers, the elderly, etc. – as opposed
to others. But liberal principles tend to lean on procedural norms, discursive
norms and norms of recruitment that can conflict with such populist effects.
Or rather, if liberalism is procedure, populism is affect. Procedurally, liberalism
refers itself to the rule of law, to equality of treatment, to norms of justice that
are relatively deracinated from the claims of particular communities such that
liberal politics can appear to be separated from those it aims to represent.
Hence, the populist mantra of elites that are separate from the people, even
though not much trouble is generally taken to investigate the extent to which
representatives really do constitute anything like an elite. For the populists,
they are elites by virtue of the fact that they are part of the liberal system, the
so-called establishment; it is not a serious or refutable sociological claim but a
sine qua non of the populist position.
From the viewpoint of populism, liberal norms can be deeply frustrating. And
indeed populism is not always without reason in its scepticism about liberal pol-
itical norms. As Carl Schmitt demonstrated in his symptomatic exposé of the
contradictions of parliamentary democracies, liberal representatives tend to
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chatter to each other, or tend to be seen to be people who merely chatter with
each other (Schmitt, 1985 [1923]). The etymology of ‘parliament’ must have
been at the forefront of Schmitt’s mind here, and no doubt Chantal Mouffe is
right to point out that there is insight in the populist position on liberalism
(Mouffe, 2005; cf. Müller, 2016, p. 8) – that the rules of the game tend to
pitch political argument only towards the centre at the expense of other ideas,
other solutions, which is not the least of the reasons that liberal democracies
tend to be somewhat passionless environments. Populism engages its opponents
with nothing so much as passion, not as an irrationalist option but with what
seems more often than not to be a deliberate alternative to unimpassioned
liberal argument. After all, it is difficult to be passionate about liberal democra-
cies. They are generically suboptimal in terms of their outcomes; they always
lead to disappointment if simply because all decisions are products of negotiation
and compromise rather than being expressions of a popular will, and because
party-governance often means that leadership tends to be of the second-best
variety (Osborne, 2014). Populism, therefore, is something like an inevitable
symptom of the innate limits that are constitutive of liberal democracies.
Populism is dangerous
Populism, we have argued in a deflationary spirit, is an inevitable and not
necessarily a wholly undesirable feature of political life in liberal democracies.
Yet a deflationary approach does not mean that populism is not a problem. If
it is not a pathology or a darkened shadow this does not mean that – empirically
speaking – populism cannot be dangerous for democracies. It is a matter of the
extent to which this or that populism wishes to assert its identitarian claims and
how much it is willing to compromise, or not, with the existing rules of the pol-
itical game. Populisms, unless moderated by other forces, tend to a Manichean
approach to political life. The complexities of politics are reduced to an either/
or dilemma; you are either with us or against us, part of the elite or in sympathy
with the establishment. Solutions tend to be similarly stark: build a wall to keep
out Mexicans, leave the European Union. This is why the referendum is the
perfect – and deeply anti-liberal – instrument for political populism. The Man-
icheanism of extreme forms of populism, whether of right or left, tends to make
them both hyper-political and, in some ways, anti-political. Populism can be
hyper-political in terms of enthusiasm, the generation of strong passions and
commitments; equally, it can be anti-political in the sense of a refusal of com-
promise, a resistance to engaging in the give-and-take of politics, a resistance
to acting in terms of what Weber called the ethics of responsibility as
opposed to the ethics of conviction. So often populism actually seems to
bypass politics-as-usual, as with Donald Trump’s notorious twitter rants. It
has an energy that is surplus to the problems in hand, and in spite of the get-
things-done ethos it tends to be more often than not about the release of
emotion than getting anything done.
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Manicheanism tends to be self-perpetuating; it leads to a spiralling rather
than a regulation of fear. Populisms, unless moderated, are dangerous not
least because they are reductive about fear. Of course, fear is a normal part of
political – and other kinds of – existence; but populism makes fear, as it
were, prior to reason; it builds makeshift reasons around its fears rather than
basing its fears on reason. Populism in this sense is passion draped in ad hoc
reasoning, rather than the proper impassioned reasoning of politics. Manichean-
ism and the fundamentalism of fear are connected. Any political psychology of
populism would have to consider its tendency to paranoid structures. Popu-
lisms, especially but not exclusively those of the right, project the other as
entirely adverse in a Manichean way; the European Union, Muslims, Mexicans,
foreign states. Those who are criticized are all equally beyond the populist pale,
not as political opponents but as enemies.
Of course, it is not particularly novel to state this Manichean element to
populism. But it leads to an interesting realization; namely, that we need a
much more nuanced understanding of how fear plays out in political life.
One step towards this would be to distinguish fear from caution, a distinction
that might be somewhat parallel to that between uncertainty and risk in econ-
omics and the sciences of probability. The distinction, expressed in this form,
is doubtless too sharp but hopefully at least indicative of a real difference. Lib-
eralism sees itself, we could argue, as typically centred upon the politics of
caution: if the government does A or B, then the consequence will be C or
D. Liberal political discourse does not consist of friend–enemy relations. Carl
Schmitt was right about that, but wrong about the implications (cf. Schmitt,
1985 [1923]). Liberal politics – parliamentarism in Schmitt’s argot – is indeed
about discussion; but the jargon of friends and enemies, contra Schmitt, is
best left to situations of warfare. Politics is constituted, in any case, not by deci-
sionism and the reductive contrast of friends and enemies but by debates
between opponents in an argument (see Williams, 2007). One is wary of
opponents, but, since they share the rules of the game, one does not exactly
fear them in the way that one fears one’s enemies, for enemies are seen as
being outside the rules of the game altogether. Instead, the liberal view would
be that one cautions against the views, and policies, of one’s opponents. The
basis of the distinction between government and opposition is between a
body that proposes and a body that cautions over what will occur if the govern-
ment’s proposals go ahead.
Political caution relies on fear to the extent that it specifies future outcomes
that may be undesirable. But a wholesale politics of fear is different; fear is
always more than the sum of whatever is cautioned. Fear, in that sense, plays
on ignorance, it is fear of the unknown. Like uncertainty, populist fear is not
always specific as to what its object is. This, paradoxically, gives populism a fun-
damentalist quality; it is the unknowability of the fear that makes it so unargu-
able. Precisely because fear is expansive and amorphous its indices have to be
both concrete – foreigners, elites – and mobile. Boris Johnson did not exactly
‘caution’ about Turkey’s possible membership of the European Union so
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much as invoke it as a fear. Then once the point is made, and even if it is refuted,
the campaign moves onto other things, other fears. This is not least why to claim
that populism is a form of ‘post-fact’ politics is in fact a little misleading in the
sense that the facts are not what is at issue (cf. Thompson, 2016); it is not the
facts that matter, but the manipulation of fear. When populists enunciate a
fear, then they have told the truth, whatever the actual facts. For facts belong
to caution, and the populist is not playing the political game of caution. More-
over, populist fear is unidirectional: the fear is generated by an extraneous other.
It is a zero-sum game between the forces of good (the people, however defined)
and bad (the elite, the establishment, etc.). Liberalism has a more multi-faceted,
complex notion of fear; in cautioning against one danger, one always runs the
risk of generating others. Liberalism, quite properly, is afraid of fear; in some
ways it is the political reflexivity of fear, attempting to limit fear so far as possible
in order to promote the values of autonomy (Shklar, 1998). For instance, in
fighting terrorism, one has to caution the public to be vigilant, but such caution-
ing, if it descends to outright fear-mongering, becomes counter-productive.
Indeed, it plays into the hands of the terrorists’ agenda, which is, precisely,
to spread fear. For liberalism, fear is itself always something to be cautioned
against since it is not a ‘transparent’ emotion but has a political inertia of its own.
We have said that populism is dangerous in so far as it can spread fear. Prop-
erly political populisms may be dangerous in this sense. But there is another
kind of dangerousness attached to other, less political, styles of populism –
that, paradoxically, of irrelevance. Populisms are adept at generating moral
indignation. This is particularly so of populisms of the left. Corbynism would
be a case in point here. It remains largely an oppositional, moral movement
attempting to gravitate towards a political one. This does not mean that it has
no political purchase, far from it. But there is a difference between a social
movement and a political party. Perhaps the greatest political achievement of
Corbynism was the adoption by Theresa May of elements or at least the rheto-
rics of a labour policy. Populisms can influence politics, but in many cases they
do not do politics. This is why very often populist movements fade from view
just as they seem to be at their most successful. They are subject to capture.
The US Populist Party of the 1890s signalled a certain degree of ideological
success by being subsumed into the Democratic Party. A similar fate with
regard to the UK Tories might very well await UKIP. In France, politicians
on the right seek to don some of the clothing of the Front National. It is as if
there is an implicit choice between effervescence and dynamism outside politics,
or being captured by politics, being so to speak subject to the moderations of
politics.
Populisms into power
There is no such thing as pristine populism; populisms always have to adapt
with regard to accession to office and accommodation with power. Here we
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are invoking something broadly equivalent to Max Weber’s routinization
problem (Weber, 1968, p. 1121 ff.). Weber famously argued that charisma is
subject to problems of routinization when transferred from a principle of idea-
tional effervescence to a principle of rule. Routinization, for him, meant that the
force of charisma tended to decline when exposed to the mundane rigours of
office. But routinization is also something that needs to be achieved: a transfer
has to be made from the indulgencies of protest to the responsibilities or at least
the challenges of power. How do populisms function when they are in power?
Are there, as it were, rules of translation from populism to power that can be
cited in this respect?
As a prelude to this, we might draw some inspiration fromWeber and make a
distinction between populism per se and a specific variety of it, what we referred
to earlier as the populism of office. As Weber argued, there is such a thing as the
charisma of office, where charisma derives as much from the holding of office
itself as from the adulation of a following (Weber, 1968, pp. 1139–1141).
Putin or Erdoğan’s populism seems as much derived from their status in
office as from any prior build-up of populist support. Putin was in the KGB,
Erdoğan was a semi-professional footballer before becoming mayor of Istanbul
but was hardly known as a populist demagogue as opposed to a pragmatic if
potentially Islamist fixer-politician. We could say something parallel in terms
of Perón; his populist appeal derived originally from a period at the Argentine
Labour ministry in the early 1940s, although ejection from office in 1945 also
helped his profile as man of the people rather than the established powers.
Office aided Perón’s populist appeal, as did raising wages and giving workers
rights. But Evita added charisma: self-described with some accuracy as ‘from
the humble people’ she claimed that she knew their suffering.
When, as in the cases of Erdoğan and Putin, popular appeal serves to conso-
lidate authoritarian rule, this has much to do with the absence of a strong, bal-
ancing liberal tradition, together with the deployment of techniques for
capturing the existing state apparatus (Müller, 2016, p. 44). But to achieve
the latter, account needs to be made of the existing available material of politics.
Populisms, as we stressed earlier, have to adapt, at least initially, to the context
of the relative presence or absence of liberal norms and institutions. This is
Machiavellian subietto again. The less liberalism that is already there, the
more scope for authoritarianism. On the other hand, if populists can adapt
those institutions and norms themselves in directions favourable to their own
ends, then they can to an extent displace the existing political culture. Silvio
Berlusconi’s extensive control of the Italian media allowed him to ‘de-liberalize’
Italian political society and to control the agenda for himself. Putin and Erdoğan
represent comparable examples. Independent media are a liberal institution, and
obviously a threat to populisms; capturing the media, or in Trump’s case
attempting to discredit it, can be integral to changing the rules of the game.
More generally, there are undoubtedly cases that work in the other direction,
where office dilutes rather than augments the effervescences of populism.
Syriza’s move from opposition movement to government would be an
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obvious case in point here. In states with strong traditions of liberal democracy
we might expect this sense of adaptation to be even more marked. We should
include preparation for office in our remit, as well as actual succession. The
Front National in France has under Marine le Pen obviously attempted to
adapt in a more liberal direction – liberal in the sense of playing more within
the rules of the game, not in the sense of an expansive tolerance. This is not
just a matter of leadership style. Under Marine le Pen, the Front National is
a different kind of organization than it was under her father’s control; it
engages with the political sphere in a different way and is in some respects
less populist. But the one step back is in the interests of several steps
forward. Due to the structure of the electoral system for the French presidency,
and since le Pen cannot hope to gain the kinds of media control enjoyed by Ber-
lusconi, Putin or Erdoğan, some adaptation to liberal norms and values has been
imperative (Carpentier, 2015).
However, accommodation has its perils. In the case of Syriza in Greece,
translation into power – after an initial honeymoon period – has occurred
more or less entirely at the expense of the original populist effect. Syriza has
had to conform to the rules of the game in the form of the European Union’s
apparatus of financial and, by extension, political regulation. Syriza was a popu-
list movement that has become a regular, liberal political party and in the
process lost most of its passionate oppositional effervescence. Something
similar, one imagines, would have to happen to Corbynism were it ever to
hope to accede to power. Another strategy, however, is for populist outsiders
to seize control of existing parties. This is what Donald Trump did with the
Republican Party, and the example seems to be more or less unique. Opponents
of Corbyn of course regard his elevation to the Labour leadership as being
something of a coup, but the example is quite different. Corbyn represents a
form of London metropolitan leftism that has a long-standing tradition within
the UK Labour Party, but there is no parallel in the US case. The Tea Party
was of course a vibrant, populist – and influential – wing of the Republican
Party; but Trump was not a product of the Tea Party, and the Tea Party is
not Momentum. Trump genuinely – almost accidentally (one suspects largely
as a result of the weakness and indecision of his opponents, combined with
the idiosyncrasies of the US primary system) – captured the Republican
Party for himself. And yet, quite aside from populism, which was only part of
Trump’s strategy, there is a political category that might fit this situation
well. This is the category of usurpation, put forward by Constant, above all
in contrast to despotism. There are despotic aspects to both Putin and
Erdoğan, no doubt; but Trump made use of the existing apparatus of liberal
governance to further his ends. ‘Despotism’, writes Constant, ‘banishes all
forms of liberty; usurpation needs these forms in order to justify the overturn-
ing of what it replaces; but in appropriating them it profanes them’ (Constant,
1988b [1815], p. 95). In other words, populism in this kind of context, at least, is
parasitic precisely on the liberal apparatuses of government that it purportedly
opposes. And Constant adds tellingly: ‘Despotism stifles freedom of the press;
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usurpation parodies it’ (Constant, 1988b [1815], p. 96). Populism in such con-
texts is democracy more or less as farce, but in paradoxically requiring liberal
democratic institutions for its sustenance it is less likely to want to suppress
them altogether.
Populists seek to build movements rather than work with parties, though they
might try to establish new ones; it is rare for populists to capture existing parties.
As a rule, parties are caging devices. They use populism, but they also tend to
restrict its scope, they channel it for electoral – as opposed to effervescently
populist – ends. Typically they bring what has captured them further to the
centre ground. Other examples where populists have captured parties are
really quite different from the Trump example, and the contrast reveals the
weakness rather than the strength behind Trump’s situation. Max Weber, in
a brilliant analysis, showed how charismatic rule and bureaucratic procedural-
ism could be bedfellows in politics, describing Gladstone, for instance, as a ‘ple-
biscitary dictator’ able to stand above parliament and, having captured the party
machine, speak directly to the masses (Weber, 1994 [1918], p. 343). But in this
case, who really captured whom? Gladstone captured the party, but then the
party captured him as well: a case, then, of mutual capture. And Tony Blair
or Margaret Thatcher would be similar cases. Each captured their party and
then established a formidable party machine to promote them; but the party
machine existed at a level of organization deeper than merely their personalities.
Both were expendable. The Trump case is intriguing in relation to this. It is
arguable whether Trump has captured or simply bypassed the Republican
party; or alternatively whether the Republican Party willl be able to capture
him. One suspects, given the strength of the Republicans across the board
(Senate, House of Representatives and Supreme Court), that it will. More intri-
guing, still, is the extent – if at all – to which Trump will be constrained not just
by the US constitutional order but by the liberal norms of politics themselves.
As we have pointed out, liberal democracies are not unities but strange amal-
gams of populist affects, democratic norms and liberal forms of proceduralism.
It is an uneasy mix, and the next four years in the United States will be a kind of
natural experiment in terms of their on-going interrelations.
Concluding remarks
We have sought to downplay some of the more essentialist diagnoses of the
populist moment, without for all that necessarily allaying any of the concerns
that have been voiced about the recent wave of anti-liberal sentiment across
the globe. However, we believe that what is to be feared in relation to the
various components of this wave of populism is on the one hand highly differ-
entiated since no single movement is alike and, on the other, often not to be
related specifically to populism at all. Authoritarian leaders such as Putin or
Erdoğan use populism to a greater or lesser extent, but what is to be objected
to in what they do is more down to authoritarianism than populism per se.
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Populism is part of the toolbox, not the central issue. Similarly with Trump,
who is a populist – but also obviously enough, yet more importantly, a racist,
a misogynist and much else besides. More often than not when the concept
of populism is invoked we might be invoking with greater pertinence other
phenomena such as authoritarianism, Caesarism, illiberalism, class struggle, pol-
itical romanticism, racism and so on.
Even asserting that there is a general movement at stake – a wave of popu-
lisms – is problematic. Of course one can invoke general causes to explain
this apparent wave, and such general causation seems to give the wave itself
some kind of salience (Moffitt, 2016). The most obvious causal factors are
those associated with globalization. Indeed at a counter-factual level were we
to subtract globalization from the political reality of the past few decades we
would have seen much less populism. But the key is not what populisms
have in common, in this case in terms of causation, but how they play out at
a political level; and at this level there is more difference than commonality.
Populism is a moral force that manifests itself in a diversity of political
expressions. But if it signals anything more widely, it signals something political
not moral; above all, it signals that the principle of trust in liberal democracies
has become narrowed and curtailed. As Rosanvallon emphasizes, the issue is to
do with trust (Rosanvallon, 2008). We live in societies where trust relations have
been largely hollowed out in bureaucratic emptiness, where the use of ‘thick
concepts’ of moral life is relegated to minorities and the marginalized. The
very idea that liberal representation should entail a principle of trust must
come under strain in such circumstances. The solution, if there is one, is
likely to lead down the road of a widening and diversification not only of democ-
racy but also of liberalism itself rather than an over-emphasis on expunging the
perils of populism (cf. Müller, 2016, chapter 3). The relative shallowness of con-
stitutional liberalism in so many respects – the absence of any meaningful sep-
aration of powers, the creeping predominance of executive power, the retreat
into bureaucratic formalism and political correctness and the lack of confidence
in as well as respect for the representative principle – is the major issue here.
Populism is certainly a symptom but it is not the only problem.
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